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III) DUNCAN - RECIPE FOR DISENGAGEMENT
by Richard Jolly*
This brief note argues that the Duncan Committee's
recommendations on commercial and aid representation
overseas are inconsistent and illogical - supposedly
based on hard-headed cost-effectiveness calculations
but in fact using a confused logic to argue for a
dangerous disengagement from the third world. Lest
there be any misunderstanding, however, let it be clear
that the argument of this note, though it concentrates
on aid and trade evidence, ultimately rests not on
the finer points of financial calculations but on the
broad view that disengagement is dangerous and
misguided. The developed countries have increasingly
pulled ahead of the developing countries over the last
twenty years, widening the gap which divides rich and
poor, white and non-white, industrialized and agricul-
tural. As this gap widens, more bridges are required,
not fewer. Fr a major report to say so little on
this major issue while saying so much on commercial
advantage and cost-effectiveness calculations saving
£5 or £10 million, is to base far-reaching proposals
on short-sighted principles.
In Chapter 6, the Duncan Committee argues that
commercial work is the most urgent task of our
overseas representatives and that commercial staff in
the diplomatic service should increasingly be shifted
to the advanced industrialised countries, the so-called
'area of concentration'. But in addition the
Committee singles out four countries in the outer area -
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Japan - and
the communist countries as being of special iiiterest
for Britain's trade and justifying special treatment.
This presumably means having a concentration of
commercial staff in those countries (although the text
is not entirely explicit on this point).
*Fellow of the Institute of Development Studies
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There is, in fact, little new in these recommend-
ations, as the figures in Table I show. Over the last
decade, much the fastest growth in the commercial
staff of the diplomatic service has been in Western
Europe, North America and the Communist Countries.
In this respect the Duncan Committee recommends
continuing an already well-established trend for the
concentration of commercial staff in the developed
countries.
The new feature is recommending that Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and South Africa (the 'free-
enterprise four') be areas for commercial concentra-
tion, and it is in the grouping of these within the
area of concentration and the exclusion of the third
world that inconsistency appears. If one wishes to
concentrate on areas where British exports have grown
fastest, why include Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
South Africa, which taken together have recorded the
slowest growth of British exports over the last decade?
If, as seems more logical, one wishes to concentrate
export promotion staff on areas where Britain has
been slipping behind, why exclude the third world,
which has also been slipping behind, but which still
accounts for over twice the volume of exports
attributable to the 'free-enterprise' four?
This inconsistency is not much eased when one
turns from the figures to the verbal comments given
by the Committee. They state that British firms already
"have many established contacts" in the 'free
enterprise four', to the point where difficulties
often arise "because the path is too well trodden".
In contrast, in the rest of the non-communist "outer
area" - which according to Duncan is not to be
emphasized - there is 'an urgent necessity to develop
new outlets'. Moreover, in the developing countries
the emphasis is on large capital projects, with strong
elements of government intervention - surely the
very type of market where the expertise of diplomatic
commercial staff is most valuable (as they argue it
is in the communist countries). Obviously the
comparisons are more complex than these quotations
suggest, but it is difficult to conclude from the evid-
ence given that there are strong comiercial reasons
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for separating the third world so sharply from all
the rest.
When one turns to aid, the recommendations of
the Committee seem even less substantiated and more
governed by preconceptions. Fifty-six persons in
the overseas diplomatic service work full-time and
the equivalent of just over 60 work part-time
administering nearly £200 millions of aid. This, to
Duncan, seems sufficient to secure an effective use
of aid.
It is salutary to consider the distribution of
diplomatic staff with commercial and aid responsibil-
ities in the third world, as shown in Table 2.
First one notes that each full-time aid officiai
overseas is on average responsible for £3.2 million
of aid expenditure and 240 technical assistance
personnel, or roughly half these amounts if one takes
account of support from others working part-time on
aid. The responsibility for £3.2 m. capital aid may
be contrasted with the value of exports per commercial
staff man, which averages £5.6 million in the third
world and about £10 million elsewhere. Considering
that aid, unlike trade, involves the diplomatic
service in direct administrative responsibilities,
it is difficult to believe that Britain is over-
administering aid in the field, when the total cost
of the aid staff overseas is roughly 0.2 of 1 per cent
of the aid involved, and the number of British aid
staff in relation to aid given is much less than for
other aid donors.
But the Duncan Committee recognizes that it is
technical work which involves most of the administra-
tive burden - "not only routine activity but regular
checking that the person's services are being
adequately used". Would any commercial firm undertake
this sort of man management with a ratio of one person-
nel officer to 240 staff - 400 in Africa
- on top of
responsibilities for £3 million capital aid? This is
surely not over-administration but severe under-
administration.
23
There are two replies to this charge of penny
pinching under-administration of aid. First, that aid
staff abroad have only limited functions, since the
main burden of administration falls on the recipient
government. Second, that Britiéh. aid staff abroad are
in any case supported by all the facilities and staff
of the Ministry of Overseas Development in London,
which handles the bulk of the work. Both points are
true but neither affects the charge of under-
administration abroad.
Obviously the recipient government has prime
responsibility for administering capital aid or
technical assistance staff and the U.K. only limited
responsibility. But at every stage, the whole process
requires a great deal of mutual discussion and
negotiation - and the style and capacity of administra-
tion in many developing countries is such that this
is often done far better by personal discussion and
negotiation in the country than by lengthy correspond-
ence with London. It is increasingly clear that the
lack of contact within the developing countries
between permanent U.K. aid staff and officials of the
recipient government acts as a real barrier to the
efficient matching of the type and timing of aid
needed to the type and timing of aid supplied.
This also explains the weakness in the argument
that aid staff abroad are already strongly supported
by staff in London. Staff in London have an obvious
and important role but they are no substitute for
aid staff abroad. Indeed, with twelve persons in
the Ministry of Overseas Development in London to
each person employed full-time on aid work in an
overseas post, the balance between the centre and
overseas is already lopsided - too much in London, too
little abroad.
In this respect, the Duncan recommendation for
fewer permanent staff abroad, and more flying visitors
will only make the position more imbalanced. On
this matter, as with the area of concentration, the
Duncan proposals largely recommend the continuation
of a trend already well established - and, as regards
the balance in aid staff, one which experience has
shown to be inadequate.
Moreover, the Duncan Committee shows little
recognition of the contrasts in their own comparative
data (Appendix H) between the area of concentration
and the third world. In Paris, Washington (and
Moscow) a U.K.-based officer could make weekly visits
for at least twenty-seven weeks a year for no more
than it would cost to support him and his family in
the same place permanently. But in most of the third
wood the balance of advantage is much reduced - to
t equivalent of ten or tive visits a year - while
the loss of effectivenessand understanding of the
local situation is likely tobe much greater. This,
one might think, would lead Duncan to recommend fewer
overseas postings in the developed world and relative
strengthening of posts in the third world - exactly
the opposite of what they in fact recommend. Even
with more generous travel facilities, it is unlikely
that many officers, with families in England, will
spend more than a few weeks in a developing country
each year - thus leaving the burden of continuing aid
administration in the field in the hands of the few
full- or part-time aid officials and perpetuàting
the imbalance between the centre and overseas.
For these reasons, it is difficult to believe
that the Duncan proposals for concentrating on the
developed countries are really founded on the object-
ive analyses of costs and advantages for conmierce or
aid which they present in their report. Rather it
seems that they have decided for broader reasons to
concentrate on the developed countries - to go all out
for friendship in the rich men's club, as it seems -
and disengage from the rest. It is not an image of
Britain - or of any developed country
- that I like.
And it rests on a narrow view of world relations in
the next few decades.
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